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REPORT:
Tying Teacher Evaluation to Student Test Performance in
New York State
Executive Summary


Tying teacher evaluation to student test performance evolved as a result of federal legislation



Arguments in favor of tying teacher evaluation to student performance:
o Reliable measure of teacher effectiveness
o Useful when analyzing student test scores over time
o Objective measure of teacher accountability
o Proven results in practice



Arguments against tying teacher evaluations to student performance:
o Unreliable measure of teacher effectiveness
o Unintended consequences





Financial burden on schools



Demoralization of teachers and reduced professional autonomy



Narrowly tailored curriculum according to test subjects



Increased pressure on students



Students opting out of standardized testing



Teachers’ avoidance of students with special needs



Manipulation of and fraudulent tampering with test results

Alternatives for reform:
o Eliminate student test performance from teacher evaluations
o Lower the weight of student test performance on teacher evaluations
o Use student test scores as a teacher development tool rather than punitively



Recommendation for reform

o Change locus of decision-making from State Legislature to State Education
Department and Board of Regents
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Report, authored by a small group of third-year law students under the guidance of
their Professor,* focuses on the controversial issue of tying teacher evaluations to student
performance on state assessments, specifically, as this practice has been applied under New York
State law. First, we provide a brief history of the federal and state laws that have resulted in the
implementation of this practice. We then examine the arguments both for and against using
student performance on state assessments as a measure of teacher effectiveness, assess all
options for amending or abolishing the practice, and propose one procedural recommendation.
II. HISTORY & BACKGROUND OF TEACHER EVALUATION IN NEW YORK
Originally, each New York public school district was required to have a development
committee, consisting of faculty and administrators, which would submit a professional
development plan to the State Education Department or have one on file.1 The plan included a
process for evaluating teachers, which generally consisted of administrators conducting teacher
observations.2
In 2002, President George W. Bush secured passage of the No Child Left Behind Act
(“NCLBA”), aimed at improving performance in primary and secondary schools. 3 The NCLBA
required states to increase accountability for student performance through state chosen
assessments in the fields of mathematics and reading for grades 3-8.4 Scores were broken down
by various student characteristics, including “poverty, race, ethnicity, disability, and limited
English proficiency.”5 States that implemented the NCLBA’s requirements received federal
funding.6 Teachers hired with federal funds linked to the NCLBA were required to meet a
“highly qualified” level of effectiveness.7
In 2007, New York revamped its teacher evaluation system by implementing Education
Law section 3012-b.8 Section 3012-b required three factors to be considered when evaluating a
teacher:9 (1) the teacher’s use of available student data when providing instruction, (2) peer
review, and (3) an assessment of the teacher’s performance by the teacher’s building principal or
other building administrator.10 Section 3012-b was New York’s first step in developing a teacher
evaluation system that linked teacher accountability to student performance, as it mandated that

*The following students at the Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University (J.D. Candidates, 2017)
collectively researched, wrote, and edited this paper as part of a third-year seminar on Law Reform: Anthony
Ciaccio, Richard DeMaio, Ashley Flynn, Sean Hanssler, Michelle Malone, Steven Mare, George Santiago, and
Victoria Short, under the guidance and instruction of Robin Charlow, Professor of Law.
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8 NYCRR § 100.2(dd) (2016).
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Id.
Sabrina R. Moldt, Making the Grade: A Ground-Level Analysis of New York State's Teacher Performance Review
Under the APPR, 2016 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 217, 220 (2016).
4
See
NCLB
Executive
Summary,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
EDUCATION,
http://www2.ed.gov/nclb/overview/intro/execsumm.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2016).
5
Id.
6
20 U.S.C. § 6311(a)–(b).
7
20 U.S.C. § 7801.
8
N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3012-b.
9
Id.
10
Id.
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teacher evaluations be based on analysis of student data11 and required a statewide evaluation
system that linked teacher accountability to student performance.12
Following the expiration of the NCLBA, in 2009, President Obama used the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act to “reshape policy for elementary and secondary schools”
through a program known as Race to the Top (“RTTT”).13 To qualify for a significant new
federal grant, RTTT requires a state to submit a federally approved plan that demonstrates its
commitment to, among other things, student achievement, teacher success and accountability,
and improving “weak” schools.14 Under the RTTT, students are still subjected to standardized
testing from grades 3-8 and student test scores must be a significant factor in evaluating
teachers.15
In hopes of qualifying for RTTT funds, in 2010, New York State enacted education
reform legislation that included the Annual Professional Performance Review (“APPR”) under
Education Law section 3012-c.16 This section, which replaced section 3012-b, required that
teachers be evaluated based on three categories, the sum of which would determine an
individual’s evaluation: (1) sixty percent based on classroom observations,17 (2) fifteen to twenty
percent determined by some other measure instituted by the district,18 and (3) the final twenty to
twenty-five percent based on state standardized examinations that measured student growth.19
This final component was determined by student growth and improvement in English and Math
for grades 4-8.20 Based on these scores, each teacher would receive an overall evaluation of
highly effective, effective, developing, or ineffective (also known as the “HEDI” system). 21
In April 2015, the APPR was amended and will eventually be replaced by section 301222
d. The newer system requires that fifty percent of a teacher’s overall score be based on testing
and HEDI scores, and the remaining fifty percent on classroom observations.23 The classroom
observation component now requires teachers to undergo two to three classroom observations.24.
11

Id.
Compare N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3012-b, with N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3012-c(2)(b)(1).
13
See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., RACE TO THE TOP EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (2009),
http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf.
14
Id. RTTT proposes four reform objectives: “(1) . . . ensure students are prepared to achieve in ‘college and the
workplace . . . ’; (2) . . . test student growth and success rates . . . ; (3) ‘recruiting, developing, rewarding, and
retaining “effective” teachers and principals’; and (4) improving the weakest schools.” Id.
15
Id. Principals are also evaluated under the APPR, but for purposes of this Report, the focus is on teachers.
16
See id; see also N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3012-c.
17
N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3012-c(2)(h). It was mandated that each teacher undergo two observations, and districts were
to choose from a list of rubrics to evaluate each teacher.
18
Id. § 3012-c(2)(a)(1). Many districts opted to use SLOs (student learning objectives) in which teachers would
distribute some type of pre- and post-test that would earn all points available if a certain percentage of students
improved on the post-test.
19
Id.
20
Id. § 3012-c(2)(b)(1).
21
Id. § 3012-c(2)(a)(1).
22
Id. § 3012-d.
23
Id. New York’s Governor Andrew Cuomo decided teacher evaluations should be based fifty percent on student
standardized test scores. He said the increase was to simplify and standardize the evaluation system, rather than
having it be locally negotiated. Diane Ravitch, Cuomo Wants Test Scores to Count for 50% of Teacher Evaluation,
DIANE RAVITCH’S BLOG (Jan. 21 2005), https://dianeravitch.net/2015/01/21/cuomo-wants-test-scores-to-count-for50-of-teacher-evaluation/comment-page-1.
24
N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3012-d(4)(b). One observation must be an announced formal principal evaluation, which
comprises eighty percent of the teacher’s observation score, and one is to be done by an unannounced, independent
observer, making up the other twenty percent. See id.
12
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This last amendment, particularly the increased weight placed on student test scores, was
met with widespread pushback. Significant numbers of parents opted their children out of state
standardized tests in fear of their children being under too much pressure and stress.25 In
response, the New York State Department of Education (“DOE”) instituted a transition period
that will last until 2019, in which schools are still required to abide by section 3012-d while the
Legislature decides how better to deal with teacher evaluations. 26 During this current period,
state standardized test scores, resulting in HEDI scores, are merely “advisory”, and districts can
replace these scores with their own student learning objectives (“SLOs”).27
In December 2015, Congress enacted the Every Student Succeeds Act (“ESSA”).28
ESSA, which takes effect at the start of the 2017-18 school year, gives some teacher evaluation
authority back to the states.29 The controversial student performance tie-in to teacher evaluations
required by RTTT is not a requirement under the new ESSA. 30 In essence, ESSA allows states
to eliminate the student performance tie-in and still receive federal funding under RTTT31—
which some states have begun to do.32

III. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF TYING TEACHER EVALUATION TO STUDENT
PERFORMANCE
A Value Added (“VA”) approach is a system used to evaluate teachers based on their
impact on students’ test scores.33 Supporters of the VA approach have argued that it has proven
to be a reliable measure of teacher effectiveness,34 can be useful when looking at trends in

See Valerie Strauss, New York’s Costly Experiment in Test-Based Educator Evaluation is Crashing, WASH. POST
(Nov.
17,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2015/11/17/new-yorks-costlyexperiment-in-test-based-educator-evaluation-is-crashing/.
26
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 30-3.17 (2015)
27
Id.
28
Every Student Succeeds Act, Pub.L. 114–95 (2015); see also Alyson Klein, The Every Student Succeeds Act: An
ESSA Overview, EDUCATION WEEK (Mar. 31, 2016), https://www.edweek.org/ew/issues/every-student-succeedsact/. The Act can be found at http://www2.ed.gov/documents/essa-act-of-1965.pdf.
29
See id.
30
Audrey Amrein-Beardsley, The “Every Student Succeeds Act” (ESSA) To Replace “No Child Left Behind”
(NCLB), VAMBOOZLED (Dec. 10, 2015), http://vamboozled.com/the-every-student-succeeds-act-essa-replaces-nochild-left-behind-nclb/.
31
See Klein, supra note 28.
32
Audrey Amrein-Beardsley, Massachusetts Also Moving to Remove Growth Measures from State’s Teacher
Evaluation Systems, VAMBOOZLED (June 2, 2016), http://vamboozled.com/massachusetts-also-moving-to-removegrowth-measures-from-states-teacher-evaluation-systems/.
33
Raj Chetty et al., Measuring the Impacts of Teachers II: Teacher Value-Added and Student Outcomes in
Adulthood, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 2633, 2633 (2014).
34
See id.; BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., LEARNING ABOUT TEACHING: INITIAL FINDINGS FROM THE MEASURES
OF
EFFECTIVE
TEACHING
PROJECT
(2013),
http://k12education.gatesfoundation.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/12/Preliminary_Finding-Policy_Brief.pdf; Thomas Kane, Should Student Test Scores Be Used
to
Evaluate
Teachers?,
WALL
ST.
J.
(June
24,
2012),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304723304577366023832205042.
25
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students’ test scores over time,35 achieves an objective measure of teacher accountability, and
has proven to be effective in at least one major troubled school system.36
Some researchers have established that individual teachers have an impact on their
students’ test scores. For example, Harvard University economist Raj Chetty and colleagues
observed teachers’ track records for improving student achievement, as measured by gains in test
scores, and what effect there was on students when teachers either left or joined a school.37
Chetty found that “when the teachers with strong track records left, student achievement in that
grade level fell,” and “when they joined a school, achievement rose.”38 Chetty also noted that
student achievement was otherwise unaffected, except in the grade or subject which the
departing teacher taught.39 While these findings are not dispositive, they demonstrate that a gain
in student test scores may play an important role in gauging teacher effectiveness.40 The study
authors conclude that student test scores may prove to be useful when combined with classroom
observation and student surveys rating their teachers.41
Detractors of the VA approach have argued that teachers evaluated using this approach
will simply coach students to perform better on tests at the expense of true learning.42 However,
a study conducted by the Gates Foundation yielded results favoring the use of the VA approach
in this regard.43 The Gates study found that “the students with the largest gains on the state tests
also tended to have larger gains on other tests which probed students' conceptual
understanding.”44 These findings suggest that teachers are not necessarily sacrificing learning for
test preparation. In fact, Gates researchers found that teachers who focused heavily on test
preparation rarely showed the highest value-added on state tests.45
In addition to the positive findings in the Chetty and Gates Foundation studies, supporters
of the VA approach have touted the model as being beneficial when looking at trends in
students’ test scores over time. In a letter to teachers and principals, Joel Klein, the former
Chancellor of the New York City public school system, maintained that “where teachers have
performed consistently toward the top or the bottom, year after year, these data surely tell us
something very important.”46 The underlying premise is that if students are consistently
performing poorly on state exams in a certain teacher’s class, this pattern may be indicative of
teacher ineffectiveness.47
35

Anna Phillips, Klein: ratings are useful for the worst and best teachers, CHALK BEAT (Oct. 25, 2010),
http://www.chalkbeat.org/posts/ny/2010/10/25/klein-ratings-are-useful-for-the-worst-and-bestteachers/#.WB4fUXeZNp8.
36
SUSAN HEADDEN, INSIDE IMPACT: D.C.’S MODEL TEACHER EVALUATION SYSTEM, EDUCATOR SECTOR REPORTS 2
(2011) http://www.nnstoy.org/download/evalution/Impact%20Report%20Release.pdf.
37
Kane, supra note 34; Chetty et al., supra note 33.
38
Kane, supra note 34.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
See infra Part IV.
43
BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., supra note 33, at 4.
44
Kane, supra note 34.
45
BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., supra note 33, at 4-5.
46
Phillips, supra note 35. Dr. Edward Melnick, Superintendent of The North Shore School District on Long Island,
who otherwise opposes the VA approach, echoed Klein’s sentiments, and said that students’ test scores could be
useful to look at longer term patterns in performance. Doctor Edward Melnick, Address at Hofstra University
Special Topics Seminar (September 19, 2016).
47
Nevertheless, even supporters of the VA approach agree that a more robust picture is needed, one that looks at
multiple measures of effectiveness. Kane, supra note 34.
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Supporters have also argued that the VA approach achieves an objective measure of
accountability. Prior to the implementation of the VA approach in the APPR, teachers in New
York were evaluated based on observations conducted by school principals a couple times a
year, often referred to as “drive-bys.”48 At the end of each year, a principal would rate the
teacher as either “satisfactory” or “unsatisfactory,” and there were no structured rules governing
how principals assigned these ratings.49 Subjective systems like “drive-bys” may not provide
accurate information on how teachers are performing because they are subject to the potential
bias inherent in human judgment. Moreover, Raymond Pecheone, co-director of the School
Redesign Network at Stanford University and an expert on teacher evaluation, warns of another
danger of subjectivity, that evaluators may not focus on the most meaningful aspects of teaching,
including its actual effectiveness. He offers the example of “[a] teacher [who] might get a
‘satisfactory’ check under ‘using visuals’ by hanging up a mobile of the planets in the Earth's
solar system, even though [his/her] students could walk out of their science class with no
knowledge of the sun's role in the solar system or other key concepts.” 50 Further, supporters
might argue that the VA approach achieves objective accountability because all students in a
certain grade or subject take the same test, so the impact of teachers on student test scores are all
estimated uniformly by the same criteria.51 Thus, using a VA approach, all teachers are treated
the same, and human judgment is absent.
Despite criticism of the VA approach, the District of Columbia public school system
experienced some success using the VA model. Prompted by the prospect of receiving federal
funds granted by RTTT, the D.C. schools implemented the IMPACT system, which employed
the VA approach by using student test score improvement to account for 50% of a teacher’s
overall effectiveness score.52 The District then experienced some of the greatest student
improvement of all major U.S. cities.53 The establishment of IMPACT coincided with an
increase in high school graduation rates and a significant rise in math and reading test scores.54
48

See Kate Taylor, New York City Teachers Score Highly Under New Evaluation System, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/17/nyregion/new-york-city-teachers-score-highly-under-new-evaluationsystem.html; Sarah Butrymowicz & Sarah Garland, How New York City’s value-added model compares to what
other districts, states are doing, THE HECHINGER REPORT (Mar. 1, 2012), http://hechingerreport.org/how-new-yorkcitys-value-added-model-compares-to-what-other-districts-states-are-doing/.
49
Taylor, supra note 48.
50
THOMAS TOCH & ROBERT ROTHMAN, RUSH TO JUDGMENT: TEACHER EVALUATION IN PUBLIC EDUCATION (2008),
http://educationpolicy.air.org/sites/default/files/publications/RushToJudgment_ES_Jan08.pdf.
51
Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Challenge to Teacher Tenure, 104 CAL. L. REV. 75, 131 (2016).
52
HEADDEN, supra note 36, at 2.
53
Id.
54
Scott Sargrad et al., Investing in Educator Capacity: An Analysis of State Race to the Top Spending, CNTR. FOR
AMERICAN PROGRESS (Dec. 2015), https://www.scribd.com/document/293556292/Investing-in-Educator-CapacityAn-Analysis-of-State-Race-to-the-Top-Spending. The District’s fourth and eighth grade averages in reading scores
increased by eleven and five points, respectively, between 2009 and 2015, and students also saw significant
improvement in their math scores. See John Davis, DC Public Schools Continues Momentum as the Fastest
Improving Urban School District in the Country, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS, chart 2 in article (Oct.
28,
2015)
http://dcps.dc.gov/release/dc-public-schools-continues-momentum-fastest-improving-urban-schooldistrict-country. D.C. fourth grade students increased their scores by twelve points from 2009-2015 and eighth
graders saw their scores jump by seven points during the same time period. Id. In order to adjust to Common Core
aligned tests, D.C. suspended the inclusion of student test scores in evaluations, but test scores are expected to be reintroduced in the upcoming school year. Alexandria Neason, Why Do Schools Keep Changing the Way They Grade
Teachers,
SLATE
(Feb,17,
2016,
3:14
P.M.),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/schooled/2016/02/17/dcps_changed_its_teacher_evaluation_system_again_why_can_t_
schools_settle.html.
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IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST TYING TEACHER EVALUATIONS TO STUDENT TEST
PERFORMANCE
Opposition to the VA model used under the APPR is well documented. Specifically,
detractors have argued that the VA approach is an unreliable measure of teacher effectiveness
and has significant unintended consequences, including financial effects, that negatively impact
teachers and students alike.
VA reliability has been rejected by a significant number of educators and researchers. 55
Unreliability is strongly attributed to the fact that the VA model currently being used is applied
on an individual basis and over brief periods, as opposed to in the aggregate over a long period.56
Scores are subject to significant fluctuation when they are specifically and narrowly applied to
each individual student because variables in individual personal characteristics are much harder
to account for than those among a broad, general population.57 When models are applied in the
aggregate, such as across an entire school district, generalizations and predictive factors are less
vulnerable to instability. Likewise, if a set of scores are apportioned to individual teachers on an
annual basis for a long term of years, the aggregate data as applied to that teacher are less
vulnerable to outliers. Thus, the greater the data set, the more stable and reliable the models can
be.58
Studies have offered support for the conclusion that VA models applied on an individual
basis are unreliable.59 One representative study followed the data of a set of teachers from five
separate school districts who fell within the lower 20% of the rating scale.60 The following year,
only 20-30% of those teachers had similarly low ratings, and 25-45% of those teachers actually
moved to the very top of the ratings scale.61 Therefore, if an evaluation used only those two
years of data, about 70% of the low-scoring teachers would have conflicting score sets from one
year to the next, confounding the question of which score is truly representative.62

55

NEWTON, X. ET. AL, Value-Added Modeling of teacher effectiveness: An exploration of stability across models and
contexts in EDUCATIONAL POLICY ANALYSIS ARCHIVES, at 23 (2010), http://epaa.asu.edu/ojs/article/view/810.
56
Stephen J. Caldas, Value-Added: The Emperor with No Clothes, November 2012, Volume 70, Number 3, Teacher
Evaluation:
What's
Fair?
What's
Effective?,
http://www.ascd.org/publications/educational_leadership/nov12/vol70/num03/ValueAdded@_The_Emperor_with_No_Clothes.aspx.
57
Id.
58
NEWTON, X. ET. AL, supra note 55.
59
Many studies support findings of similar irregularities as the study referenced here. See, e.g., Sean Corcoran, Can
Teachers be Evaluated by Student Test Scores?, http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED522164.pdf (last visited Nov. 27,
2016) (evaluating the VAM in Houston and New York finding a margin of error so large that a teacher at the 43rd
percentile (average) might actually be at the 15th percentile (below average) or the 71st percentile (above average),
the following year); Caldas, S. J., & Bankston, C. L., The effect of school population socioeconomic status on
individual student academic achievement, 90 J. OF EDUCATIONAL RES. 269–277 (1997); Caldas, S. J., & Bankston,
C. L., The inequality of separation: Racial composition of schools and academic achievement, 34 EDUCATIONAL
ADMINISTRATION QUARTERLY 533–557 (1998) (finding control models that typically only explained around 20
percent of the total causes of student test scores).
60
American Education Research Association & National Academy of Education, Getting Teacher Evaluation Right:
A Brief for Policymakers, https://edpolicy.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publications/getting-teacher-evaluationright-challenge-policy-makers.pdf (last visited Nov. 27, 2016).
61
Id.
62
Id.

7

In addition to being an unreliable and unfair measure of teacher effectiveness as it is
currently utilized, tying student performance to teacher evaluations also has deeply problematic
unintended consequences on the schools, teachers, and students in the system. The primary
consequences include: (1) an increased financial burden on schools; (2) demoralization of
teachers and reduced professional autonomy; (3) a curriculum narrowly tailored to test subjects;
(4) unreasonable pressure imposed on students; (5) parents refusing to have their children
participate in standardized testing; (6) a two-tier “gaming of the system”, when teachers limit
time investment in students who do not show room for large score improvements and school
districts manipulate data to ensure all teacher evaluations come out “effective”; and (7)
fraudulent tampering with test results.
First, significant financial burdens are imposed on schools to implement and administer
programs in order to become compliant under the APPR. A recent report surveying members of
the New York State Council of School Superintendents63 indicated that 81% were worried that
they would not have the funds or time to soundly implement the APPR evaluation system. This
was attributable in part to inconsistencies in State government actions, such as placing new
demands on schools while at the same time cutting state aid, limiting local tax increases, and
doing little to relieve costly state mandates. One contributing factor to this concern was the need
for a rapid turnaround in test scores so they can be included in end-of-year teacher evaluations,
coupled with an increased emphasis on exam security, resulting in significantly increased costs
for districts.64 Over time, these financial burdens easily outweigh the original RTTT grant for
which this system was created.
Second, superintendents have reported that the high-stakes consequences associated with
linking teacher evaluations to student scores on state assessments have caused a great deal of
fear, anxiety, stress, demotivation and demoralization among educators.65 Teacher advocates
argue that the APPR fails to recognize that teachers may be in the best position to understand
how their students learn, and to know the most effective teaching methods for enhancing student
performance. Teachers feel that under the current APPR system they are “denied the same
respect given to other professionals.”66
Third, linking teacher evaluations to student performance on tests has resulted in a “teach
to the test” approach, which has altered not only which subjects are taught, but how subjects are
taught as well. Using standardized testing to evaluate teacher effectiveness results in classrooms
focused on test preparation rather than on educating students with the skills necessary to become
engaged members of the global economy.67 When a teacher’s livelihood is directly impacted by
his or her students’ performance on state assessments, the focus of daily classroom activities
shifts to test preparation, causing the curriculum to narrow in an effort to raise student

63

THE COUNCIL OF SCHOOL SUPERINTENDENTS, AT THE EDGE: A SURVEY OF NEW YORK STATE SCHOOL
SUPERINTENDENTS
ON
FISCAL
MATTERS
(2011),
http://www.nyscoss.org/pdf/upload/AttheEdgeSurveyReportFINAL.pdf.
64
New York State Principals et. al, An Open Letter of Concern Regarding New York Stateʼs APPR Legislation for
the Evaluation of Teachers and Principals, www.newyorkprincipals.org.
65
Cheryl H. Champ, EdD, Measuring Teacher Effectiveness: The Impact of institutional Culture on initial
Implementation of New York’s Annual Professional Performance Review, 12 AASA J. OF SCHOLARSHIP & PRACT.
34, 38 (2015).
66
Id. at 241.
67
Moldt, supra note 3, at 245 (noting such a result “directly counter[s] the goals articulated under RTTT and the
APPR”).
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scores.68This narrowed curriculum targets the tested subjects of math and reading and reduces
the amount of time teachers spend instructing students in non-accountability subjects, including
the arts, music, history, and the sciences. 69 This is particularly true in elementary schools, where
teachers are responsible for teaching most, if not all, curricular areas. The curriculum within
even the tested subjects of math and reading is then narrowed even further to ensure students
score high on the tests, as teachers anticipate which topics are most likely to appear on the tests
and thus focus their instruction on those topics.
Fourth, due to the high-stakes nature of the state assessments, an immense amount of
pressure is placed on students to do well. Teachers have observed a shift in their student’s
excitement to learn as a result of this “teach to the test” attitude many feel is encouraged by the
APPR’s “tie-in” of student scores to teacher evaluation.70 For example, one teacher noted that
her second grade students said “they don’t want to go to [third] grade because of all the
testing.”71
Fifth, the pressure on students to perform well has resulted in many parents deciding it is
no longer in their children’s best interests to take these state assessments, and thus “opting-out”
by refusing to have their children sit for the standardized tests. Parents argue that, rather than
being used to help students learn or teachers teach, the test results are largely punitive, used to
punish teachers who are not performing well.72 The opt-out movement continues to grow each
year. In 2015, twenty percent of students in New York refused to take the state assessments. 73
The following year, in 2016, approximately 230,000 third through eighth grade students in New
York refused to take the state standardized math and English exams, up one percent from the
previous year.74
Sixth, an emphasis on growth measured in student test scores creates concern that
teachers and schools alike will attempt to “game the system,” which can take several forms.
First, schools will have an incentive to keep struggling students in lower-level classes that do not
require standardized assessments.75 Schools may also attempt to keep students out of
challenging classes, such as Advanced Regents and Advanced Placement courses, for fear that

68

Id. at 246.
Id; see Champ, supra note 65, at 38; Eva L. Baker et al., Problems with the Use of Student Test Scores to Evaluate
Teachers,
Briefing
Paper
#278,
Economic
Policy
Institute
at
16
(Aug.
29,
2010),
http://epi.3cdn.net/b9667271ee6c154195_t9m6iij8k.pdf.
70
Moldt, supra note 3, at 246.
71
Id. at 245 (internal quotations omitted).
72
Parents have also voiced concern that the standardized tests are forcing teachers to “teach to the test,” as discussed
previously, thus spending more time on test preparation than actual learning.
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poor performance on those examinations might result in teachers being unfairly penalized.76
Next, there is concern that teachers will attempt to avoid students with disabilities or health
and/or emotional issues that could challenge their learning or growth, ultimately having a
negative impact on the teacher’s evaluation and effectiveness rating. 77 One teacher in Upstate
New York noted that, prior to the APPR, she worked with her school to take on low performing
and emotionally disturbed students, but they did not progress at the level of other students in the
same grade, thus negatively impacting her evaluations.78 As teachers actively avoid students who
are already struggling due to the potential impact it may have on their effectiveness rating, these
struggling students become at risk of falling through the system’s gaps.79 Also, it has been
reported that many school districts have now realized how it is possible to manipulate the system
so that all teachers manage to come out with evaluations of “effective”, thus frustrating the
objective of the entire enterprise.80
Finally, there is an increasing concern that high-stakes testing will lead educators to cheat
by tampering with or illegally boosting student test scores. There have been a number of recent
scandals across the country involving educator cheating: in Galena Park, Texas, a school
distributed test-specific study guides to students after illegally reviewing that year’s state science
test; in Norfolk, Virginia, a principal pressured teachers to show students the answers for a state
reading assessment after finding a leaked copy of the test; and, in Springfield, Massachusetts, a
principal told teachers to point out wrong answers to students as they took the tests.81
V. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION FOR REFORM
This section discusses several alternatives and one recommendation for changing the
APPR as it is currently constructed. The first, and most extreme, alternative would be to
eliminate the APPR altogether and return to a mode of teacher evaluation not based on students’
test scores. The second alternative would lower the weight that test scores have in teacher
evaluations. The third alternative calls for utilizing the APPR as a teacher development tool
rather than as a means of punishing under-performing teachers. Whichever of these alternatives
is adopted, we recommend changing the locus of decision-making on these matters from the
State Legislature to the State Education Department (SED) and the Board of Regents (BOR) on
an ongoing basis.
First, while the APPR’s student performance test score tie-in is well-intentioned, its
consequences are overwhelming. One possibility is to undue it, abolishing the tie-in altogether.82
This would obviate all the issues generated by the tie-in and it would create less stress on
teachers and students.83 Teachers would no longer be teaching to the tests nor hindering
creativity in the classroom. They could focus more on educating a class based on its needs, rather
Id. at 247; Carol Burris, What the ‘thoughtless’ N.Y. government just did to teachers, WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 2015),
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than teaching with an eye toward being rated anything other than Ineffective. 84 Another
advantage of abolishing the tie-in is saving money and resources,85 as many schools have spent
more to implement the principle than they received under RTTT, and the results for many have
not been worth the cost.86 Thus, the APPR’s tie-in is more problematic than it was anticipated to
be, a change seems advisable,87 and one potential change is eliminating the tie-in from the APPR
entirely. 88 Conversely, however, eliminating the tie-in leaves us with no objective measure to
evaluate a teacher’s effectiveness in the classroom.89 Without using student performance on
standardized tests, there is no other objective and efficient way to weed out teachers who really
are ineffective.90 Also, all the money and resources already expended on the APPR will have
been wasted, and definitely would not be reimbursed, though one could argue this would be the
case whether the tie-in is retained or abolished.91
Another alternative option is to lower the weight of student test scores in evaluating
teachers. As an example, in March 2016, Georgia lowered the weight of student scores in
teacher evaluations from 50% to 30% to address many of the concerns outlined above,92
particularly the loss of discouraged professional teachers.93 By lowering the tie-in percentage,
Georgia State Superintendent Richard Woods stated that the new law “will provide a better tool
for teachers and also help recruit and retain the best teachers.”94
The final alternative for addressing the APPR’s tie-in would be to continue to collect
student performance data, but use it as part of a teacher training and development system rather
than as a high stakes tool leading to teacher termination in the short term. Instead of adding
student growth performance into the score for annual teacher evaluations, the testing data would
be collected solely to gain a better picture of performance over a longer period of time. 95 Under
84
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this proposal, schools could use the annual performance scores to identify those teachers who
consistently underperform, and create an opportunity to focus on their training and development.
This allows schools to have an objective evaluation tool to reference when addressing
underperforming teachers, without creating concern among teachers that every set of scores can
put their job in jeopardy. This proposal would not result in a complete discard of the current
system; however, it would remedy some of the chilling effects the current system has placed on
students and teachers.96 If scores were used as a training and development instrument, teachers
could feel less pressured, have more autonomy, and place less emphasis on solely getting
students to attain a certain score on an exam.
This proposal is not without its drawbacks, and it does not completely obviate many of
the issues arising out of the current APPR system. First, it will not alleviate the financial and
other burdens of standardized testing, as that would remain unchanged.97 Second, it does not
provide a response to the need for an objective standard of measurement of teacher
effectiveness.98 Third, the data itself is not useful unless it is used in conjunction with a training
and development program structured around the statistical feedback received by the VA model,
arguably adding a new and significant burden on schools. However, this proposal does address
many of the APPR tie-in issues while continuing to promote the best interests of the schools,
teachers, and students.
Regardless of which alternative is adopted, including maintaining the status quo as an
option, we recommend shifting the locus of decision making on the matter of teacher evaluation
from the Legislature to the SED and the BOR.99 By making this shift, the issue would be in the
hands of an agency that has the most expertise in this area and is thus best situated to effectively
formulate a plan for evaluating teachers, one which takes into account the significant body of
ongoing research and knowledge developed in the relevant subject matter.100 Further, because
the SED and the BOR have smaller agendas, they have the ability to focus more attention than
the Legislature can on the minutia of the teacher evaluation process. 101 Additionally, they can
more readily make adaptations to the system, when necessary, as additional pertinent information
is revealed over time, because the regulatory process is simpler than the legislative process, and
may be less politically sensitive.102 Also, the regulatory process can include outside input
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through the notice and comment rulemaking procedure, thereby creating greater sensitivity to
public concerns and, hopefully, an increased public “buy-in” to any regulatory plan.103
Conversely, moving the focus to the SED could potentially have setbacks. Some question
whether the agency is adequately staffed and funded.104 Furthermore, as an unelected body, the
SED is less politically accountable than the Legislature, which means agency officials might be
beholden to those who appoint them and not particularly responsive to public concerns.105 On the
other hand, some degree of political independence might serve as a strength, because it could
neutralize the influence of the many constituencies that have a vested interest in the matter of
teacher evaluations.
While we take no position on the many substantive issues previously identified and
analyzed, we believe that, as a procedural matter, it makes more sense to place primary decision
making authority in the administrative body going forward, at least in theory. If the agency
proves to be insufficiently effective as it takes on this role, the Legislature, as always, retains the
power to control administrative discretion should it see the need to do so in the future.
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